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MEMORANDUM FOR: (The Vice President, Acting Secretary of State,
Secretary of Defense, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of
Staff, Special Assistant for National Security Affairs,
and Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation.)

SUBJECT: Latin American Communist Party Delegations in Moscow and Communist China

1. The security report attached gives fasts about Helitad that

American delegates to the 21st CPSU Congress and Soviets in Moscow and Prague, and Chinese leaders in Peiping.

- 2. The highlights are these:
- a. The Soviets and more especially the Chinese again gave a high priority to the development and support of Communist activities in Latin America.
- b. At a secret conference of Latin American Communists in Moscow (9-13 February) ranking Soviet officials pledged continued aid and strongly advocated that U.S. imperialism be further weakened "in its own backyard". The common action program worked out by the conference emphasized campaigns against U.S. bases and missions, and against Latin American dictatorships.
- c. As an expression of their great interest in Latin America, the Chinese arranged for an intensification of

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their training program for potential Latin American

Communist leaders by adding a new four to six months!

practical training course. They laid the groundwork for

the creation of a network of press correspondents of

NCNA (New China News Agency) in Latin America, and

urged Latin American Communist parties to increase their

potential for action by creating parallel conductive.

- d. Both the Soviet and Chinese leaders appeared to
 be encouraged by the success of the Castro revolt as an
 expression of exploitable anti-U.S. trends. Mao Tse-tung
 cautioned that the Castro revolt should not be mechanically
 imitated and that legal tactics should be tried first. The

 Chinese as well as the Soviets apparently felt that current

 Communist tactics in Latin America must be so designed
 and concealed that they gain an increased capacity to
 manipulate nationalist, anti-U.S. elements before an
 actual take-over.
 - e. Unlike Khrushchev, Mao Tse-tung, Liu Shao-ch'i,

and other to Chinese leaders found time to hold discussions with the Latin American delegates. Their views included restatements of the benefits derived by the Communist parties from international tensions, which force the imperialists to spread themselves too thin. The Chinese presented their attacks in the Taiwan Straits after the U.S. landings in Lebanon as an example of the successful diversion of the imperialist forces.

They rationalized their opposition to the existence of two Chinas by claiming that this opposition created friction in the Free World, that the U.S. considered Chiang Kai-shek a liability and was ready to overthrow him.

- f. Mao asked the delegates that consideration be given to the possibility of transforming several small Latin

 American countries into one in order to resist "imperialism."

 There was no indication that the Soviets had discussed this matter with the Latin American delegates.
- g. The Latin American delegates were greatly from the impressed by the Chinese and seemed receptive to their

advice which had as its theme the applicabilities of

Chinese tactics to the underdeveloped areas of Latin

America.

h. Although the Soviets continued to consider themselves the center of international Communism, in fact they obtained agreement from all delegates to the 21st Congress that Communist literature would no longer refer to the directing role of the CPSU and the USSR and to the need for the defense of the Soviet Union. Instead, all Communist parties would be portrayed as independent and equal. It seemed clear that the Soviets were sensitive to Free World propaganda exposing the hegemony of the USSR in the International Communist Movement.

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5. This report has been furnished to (the Vice President,
Acting
the/Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman,
Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Special Assistant for National Security
Affairs, and the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Attachment

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